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Dzienkowski: Contributions of Louis Brandeis

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF LOUIS BRANDEIS TO THE LAW OF
LAWYERING
John S. Dzienkowski
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much scholarship has been written about the U.S. Senate
debate pertaining to the conduct of Louis D. Brandeis as a lawyer and
whether he represented conflicting interests in violation of the rules
of ethics.1 The overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the
opponents of Louis Brandeis sought to find any possible reason to
object to his candidacy because of their antisemitism and their
objection to Brandeis’ economic policies.2 In this essay, I examine
Professor

of Law & Dean John F. Sutton, Jr. Chair in Lawyering and the Legal Process, The
University of Texas at Austin. I extend my gratitude to Professor Samuel J. Levine and the
entire Touro Law Center community for hosting a superb conference on the life of Louis
Brandeis. I thank Robert Peroni for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58 (1978)
[hereinafter HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW]; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE
(1st ed. 2009); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683
(1965); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377 (2004)
[hereinafter Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation]; Katherine A. Helm, What Justice Brandeis
Taught Us About Conflicts of Interest, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 (2010); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive
Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445 (1996).
2 See THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND
THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1st ed. 1978). As I described in an
earlier article,
The climate surrounding the nomination was very turbulent. One
Senator later described the debate as follows:
When his nomination for Justice of the Supreme Court came up for
confirmation in the Senate, one of the bitterest fights that was ever
waged in that body took place. In those days, action of the Senate on
confirmation was held in executive session; but some of the leading
statesmen of the day, some of the ablest men in that parliamentarian
body, made a bitter, unreasonable, and unconscionable attack upon this
man. Some of these men were moved into action because of Justice
Brandeis’ religion; but I have always thought the great bulk of this
opposition, that which was the most powerful and made the greatest
effort to defeat his confirmation, came from a combination of financial
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the effect that the debate about the ethics of a distinguished lawyer
and jurist had upon the law of lawyering.
My thesis is that the use of an ethical argument to oppose a
Supreme Court nomination exposed the weaknesses in the ethics
codes and highlighted the importance of anticipating future
challenges of lawyering while conducting the practice of law. This
debate took place on a national stage in which third parties sought to
use ethics rules to demonstrate the unfitness of a lawyer to serve on
the United States Supreme Court.3 The debate attempted to
legitimize opposition to a Supreme Court nominee and develop thirdparty standing to raise conflicts of interests to disqualify a nominee.4
The conduct in question involved non-litigation representation.5 This
was one of the first examinations into ethics outside of the advocacy
setting.6 This controversy highlighted the difficulties of drafting
ethics codes in the context of non-litigation lawyering.7 In addition,
the disagreement introduced to the legal profession and the nation as
a whole, the notion of what role ethics should play in assessing a

interests which wanted to punish an able man who had often thwarted
them in their evil ways, and who feared, if he were given this great place
of honor, he might still frustrate their efforts to acquire, by questionable
means, greater financial power.
John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in
the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 749 n.43 (1992) [hereinafter
Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries], quoting George W. Norris, Address in the
Memory of Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. xxi, xxii (1943).
3 See Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary U.S. S., on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the
Supreme Court of the U.S., 64th Cong. 277-79 (1916), reprinted in 1 THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS 1916-1975 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein
comps., Buffalo, Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1977) [hereinafter 1 Hearings]; Nomination of Louis
D. Brandeis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., on the
Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.,
64th Cong. 277-79 (1916), reprinted in 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOMINATIONS 1916-1975 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein comps., Buffalo, Wm. S.
Hein & Co. 1977) [hereinafter 2 Hearings]; Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., on the Nomination of Louis D.
Brandeis to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 64th Cong. 277-79
(1916), reprinted in 3 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS 1916-1975
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein comps., Buffalo, Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1977)
[hereinafter 3 Hearings].
4 Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation, supra note 1, at 377.
5 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298.
6 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 58-60.
7 Helm, supra note 1, at 10, 15.
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lawyer’s fitness when under consideration for a judicial position.8
The opposing side countered by suggesting that Brandeis likely had a
broader view of lawyering in mind when he represented multiple
parties.9 In my opinion, this debate over the ethics of Louis Brandeis
contributed to the importance of developing the rules of ethics and in
demonstrating the different views of lawyering in the legal
profession.
II.

HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE ETHICS CONTROVERSY

A transformation occurred during the late 1800s and early
1900s in the practice of lawyering. The day-to-day work of lawyers
shifted from advocacy work to transactional practice as the client
base increasingly moved into the Industrial Revolution.10 During this
time, the legal profession was undergoing a transformation in terms
of substantive law.11 In addition, there was also a transformation in
determining how the ethical standards would be applied in a nonadvocacy setting when lawyers were called upon to provide advice to
the nation’s corporations.12 Lawyers were called upon to apply ethics
and conflicts rules developed primarily in the advocacy context to
non-litigation practice—areas of lawyering which were largely
undeveloped.13 This is the setting in which Brandeis practiced law in
a major business center in the country.14
The conduct of Louis Brandeis that was subject to the Senate
hearings involved: (1) transactional work for a family; (2) debtorcreditor work for a company in financial distress; (3) labor law work
to resolve a dispute between labor and management; and (4) lobbying
before a legislature to support public law reform that affected the
anticompetitive business practices of a former client.15 Many of these
representations occurred before the American Bar Association
8

HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 57-59.
Helm, supra note 1, at 9-10.
10 Robert T. Swaine, The Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics
of the Modern Bar, 35 AM. BAR ASS’N 89, 91 (1949). See also Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’
Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1, 6 (1999).
11 Carle, supra note 10, at 7.
12 Carle, supra note 10, at 20.
13 Swaine, supra note 10, at 91.
14 Helm, supra note 1, at 5.
15 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298.
9
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(“ABA”) promulgated the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, and
most of them before Massachusetts adopted its code of conduct for
lawyers.16
Apart from the lack of established standards to judge the
conduct of lawyers, two allegations, (1) unethical conduct because he
represented conflicting interests, and (2) not adequately informing his
clients that their interests were in conflict, during the time of the
hearings were illustrative of the debate over the conduct of
Brandeis.17 In defending Brandeis, his supporters provided evidence
that many other lawyers represented clients in similar contexts with
verbal disclosures during that time.18 The critics exaggerated when
they accused Brandeis of clear, unethical behavior and many of the
complaints relied upon the disclosures (or lack thereof) that Brandeis
made to his clients before he undertook the conflicting
representations.19 Full disclosure was required, but at that time it was
difficult to prove exactly what information and warnings Louis
Brandeis gave the parties to the transactions.20
The opponents of Brandeis crafted their arguments in an
attempt to demonstrate that Brandeis acted in an unethical manner in
his practice of law.21 The use of ethics to challenge a person’s
competence to serve as a justice on the United States Supreme Court
relied on a perception that unethical behavior accompanies
dishonesty and incompetence.22 Even today, a charge that a lawyer
behaved unethically causes an individual to conclude that such
lawyer is untrustworthy.23 Countering unethical behavior charges
was difficult outside of the context of the representation because the
process to defend against such charges would require disclosure of
confidential information.24 The arguments that labeled Brandeis as
16 Canons of Professional Ethics, MASS. L.Q., Nov. 1915, at 1, 1 (adopting the ABA
Canons in 1915); Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
17 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61.
18 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61 (comparing Brandeis’ conduct to “other
reputable lawyers that . . . had often done exactly as Brandeis.”).
19 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61.
20 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 61.
21 Frank, supra note 1, at 707.
22 Frank, supra note 1, at 685.
23 See generally Frank, supra note 1.
24 At the time, the Canons of Professional Ethics did not contain an exception to the
confidentiality obligation authorizing a lawyer to disclose confidential information in order
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unethical inevitably elevated the tenor of the debate, and thus
attracted the attention of all the participants 25 Understandably, the
members of the Senate were hesitant to openly vocalize support for a
candidate of the highest Federal court in the United States if the
candidate’s conduct was viewed to violate the norms of ethics.
III.

DEFENDING BRANDEIS’ CONDUCT AGAINST CHARGES OF
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

The defense of Louis Brandeis highlighted many important
lessons for the law of lawyering. At this time, candidates for the
Supreme Court did not personally testify before the Senate.26
Instead, their supporters would present evidence in favor of the
candidate and offer defenses to particular attacks.27 The absence of
direct testimony from Louis Brandeis adds to the mystery of what
Brandeis sought to do in his lawyering, but it also highlighted to a
broader audience the difficulty of applying rules of conduct to
transactional lawyering.28
A defense of a lawyer’s conduct in representing a client
places the lawyer in a difficult position because it often requires the
disclosure of confidential information, which is sometimes
information adverse to the client, but is needed to establish the
defense.29 In most situations, the clients are former clients and in
some cases no longer living.30 The presentation of evidence by the
accused lawyer is complicated and in situations in which the
allegations are vague, the defense may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to present. The nature of lawyering in an attorney-client
setting involves a fluid relationship that depends upon significant
to defend the lawyer’s conduct. However, the Model Rules contain such an explicit
exception now. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6(b)(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2015).
25 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 450-51.
26 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 443.
27 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 443-44.
Brandeis’ law partner, Edward McClennen,
managed the responses in favor of Brandeis during the confirmation hearings. UROFSKY,
supra note 1, at 445.
28 UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 444.
29 See John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57-58 (2013) [hereinafter Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking].
30 Legal Profession Prof, Client Interests Live on for Conflict Purposes, LEGAL PROF.
BLOG (July 30, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2010/07/clientinterests-live-on-for-conflicts-purposes.html.
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interaction between a lawyer and the client that is difficult to
replicate to properly defend the lawyer’s conduct.
When an individual contends that a judicial candidate is
unethical because he or she was involved in a conflict of interest, the
link between ethical lawyering and judicial fitness comes into
focus.31 Does a lawyer who represents conflicting interests and does
not properly disclose the conflict and obtain client consent appear
less competent to handle cases? Or is the person focused on the
profit motive from the legal fees to the disregard of the clients’
interests more competent to handle cases? The attacks grounded in
conflict of interest allegations allowed the opponents of Brandeis to
tarnish the legal career of a distinguished practitioner.32
The inclusion of a significant number of witnesses in the
hearings sent a powerful message to lawyers throughout the
country.33 It elevated the subject of professional responsibility to a
level of importance at a time when the profession was struggling with
its newly enacted code of conduct.34 As the ABA sought to adopt a
modern view of the concept of a profession, individual lawyers
representing corporations and business individuals saw the dangers
inherent in their craft.35
These charges illustrated a tension between client demands
and lawyer services, and thus highlighted that lawyers should be
mindful of conflicts and other compromising situations when
deciding whether to accept a representation.36 The Senate hearings
led some prominent lawyers, such as John Frank, to opine that
lawyers should never represent multiple clients as a situation.37 Such

31

Helm, supra note 1, at 4.
Helm, supra note 1, at 4.
33 Katherine Helm’s description of the proceedings paints a powerful picture as to nature
of the hearings. Helm, supra note 1, at 3-4 (describing the four month hearing as taking on a
life of its own).
34 Helm, supra note 1, at 19.
35 Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Preface, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2016). The ABA and the legal profession at the time of the Brandeis hearings sought to
establish its control over regulating lawyers through control of entry, discipline, and conduct.
Helm, supra note 1, at 19.
36 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
37 Frank, supra note 1, at 698. The term, “situation” was offered as a defense to the
conflicts of interest charges. Brandeis supposedly undertook a representation of the situation
whether it was a family transaction or dispute or a corporate debt crisis. By representing the
32
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advice highlighted the dangers of examining a professional’s work
for the purpose of determining whether it complied with ethical
norms.
The inquiry into the ethics of Louis Brandeis also
demonstrated the need for documented evidence of disclosures and
consents from clients and third parties. As lawyers began to
represent the business interests that grew out of the Industrial
Revolution, they needed to be mindful that their conduct could be
scrutinized years later.38 With the difficulty of establishing a defense
to a lawyer’s decisions, lawyers needed to document their decisions
with internal notes in the file, along with express client consents.39
Such documentary proof of contemporaneous consideration of the
ethical issues would provide significant contemporaneous proof for a
lawyer’s actions.40 The defense of Brandeis lacked such proof and
the hearings demonstrated the wisdom of having such evidence in the
future.41
The hearings also illustrated the notion that the success of the
role of a lawyer as a problem-solver often determines whether the
lawyer’s decisions on conflicts of interests would be subject to
scrutiny.42 If the lawyer’s conduct leads to a successful solution in a
multiple client representation, few will argue that the lawyer erred in
accepting the representation. However, if the representation fails in
forming the transaction or resolving the dispute, the lawyer’s conduct
in accepting the representation takes a center stage. The allegations
made against Brandeis involved representations that did not lead to a
successful resolution of the business and legal problem. The analysis
under the codes of ethics should be identical in both of these

situation, Brandeis sought to address the problem for the interests of all involved rather than
represent any one of the individual clients.
38 Harrison Barnes, The Industrialization of the Law Firm, BCG ATTORNEY SEARCH,
http://www.bcgsearch.com/article/60634/The-industrialization-of-law-firm/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2016).
39 Theresa M. Gronkiewicz, Twelve Tips to Help You Avoid Disciplinary Proceedings,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/12_
tips_avoid_disciplinary_proceedings_scpd_2013.authcheckdam.pdf.
40 Id.
41 David G. Dalin, The Appointment of Louis D. Brandeis, First Jewish Justice on the
Supreme
Court,
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 100: THEN & NOW 1-2,
4,
http://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/31435/LDB100Dalin.pdf?sequence=1
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2016).
42 Frank, supra note 1, at 698.
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situations; however, the reality of failed legal representation places
the lawyer at an enhanced risk.
IV.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE 1908 CANONS TO JUDGE
CONDUCT OF LAWYERS

On a mission to become a national organization that is
prominent in self-regulation of the legal profession,43 the ABA
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons) in 1908.44 One
would think that a confirmation hearing taking place in 1916 would
allow the participants in the hearing to examine the 1908 Canons in
order to determine if the concepts contained in the code should have
guided the conduct of Louis Brandeis. However, the hearing did not
go as one would have hoped.
In 1908, the ABA adopted thirty-two of the Canons.45
Canons 33 through 45 were adopted in 1928.46 Of the original
Canons, eighteen were intended to guide lawyers in litigation.47
Arguably, only one rule addressed the situations that Louis Brandeis
encountered: Canon 6, which focused on the topic of “Adverse
Influences and Conflicting Interests.”48 Under Canon 6, lawyers are
obligated to inform every prospective client of any relation, interest,
or connection to the parties or the facts of the representation.49
Additionally, lawyers may not represent conflicting interests, “except
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.”50
If one were to follow the requirements of Canon 6, the sole
question of Brandeis’ representations would be whether he properly
disclosed the conflicts to all of the clients, and whether he properly
obtained their consent. But, the opponents argued that Brandeis

43

See generally Richard L. Abel, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2395, 2395 (2003).
45 CANONS
OF
PROF’L
ETHICS
n.1
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
1908),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckd
am.pdf
46 Id. at n.8.
47 Id. at Canons 1, 3, 8, 10, 13 n.4, 17-25, 28 n.6, 31 n.7 (explaining Canon 13 was
amended in 1933, Canon 28 was amended in 1928, and Canon 31 was amended in 1937).
48 Id. at Canon 6.
49 Id.
50 CANONS OF P ROF’L ETHICS, supra note 45, at Canon 6.
44
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never should have accepted the representations in the first place.51
Thus, they were imposing a higher standard upon Brandeis in
transactional matters than was contemplated through the guidance of
Canon 6.
Scholars have argued that the drafters of the 1908 Canons
were not as concerned with conflicts of interest because they sought
to promote client autonomy. This rationale could explain the
inclusion of only one canon to guide lawyer conduct.52 However, this
would support the view that Brandeis’ conduct was consistent with
the existing norms at the time. And, if the profession sought to
impose a higher standard for conflicts of interest, it was the
obligation of the drafters to detail how a lawyer should act in
particular situations.
Subsequent amendments to the Canons included several
provisions that arguably have bearing upon the type of conduct that
was under examination in the confirmation hearings.53 Canon 35
(Intermediaries), Canon 37 (Confidences of a Client) and Canon 44
(Withdrawal from Employment as Attorney or Counsel) could have
been used by lawyers in similar situations.54 However, one might
suspect that the Brandeis confirmation hearings accentuated the
divide in the profession as to how lawyers should draft the ethical
codes.55
In the decades following the Brandeis confirmation hearings,
the ruling members of the ABA realized that the Canons of
Professional Ethics were insufficient to regulate the conduct of
lawyers in the American legal profession.56 One group sought to
draft the codes in terms of broad aspirational guidelines and another
group sought more concrete guidance and clarity in the specific
provisions.57 Less than a decade after the confirmation of Louis
Brandeis, the ABA leadership appointed a committee to revise the

51

Helm, supra note 1, at 7.
Altman, supra note 44, at 2472-74 (2003) (noting that the autonomy contained in the
canons was consistent with Brandeis’ views of independence and autonomy towards
lawyering described by Clyde Spillenger in his Yale article).
53 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
54 Id. at Canon 35, 37, 44.
55 Helm, supra note 1, at 9.
56 Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking, supra note 29, at 63.
57 Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking, supra note 29, at 61-63.
52
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Canons of Professional Ethics.58 Four efforts to revise the Canons
failed because of this schism in the ABA leadership.59 I suggest that
the Brandeis confirmation hearings had a significant influence on the
debate and the arguments illustrated how reasonable minds differed
as to the proper approach to drafting codes to regulate lawyer
conduct. In 1964, Reporter John F. Sutton, Jr. proposed a
compromise that included Canons, Ethical Considerations, and
Disciplinary Rules.60 This approach gave each group something in
the new Model Code of Professional Responsibility.61
V.

THE OPEN ENDED NATURE OF CONFLICTS ALLEGATIONS IN
LAWYERING

The opponents to the confirmation of Louis Brandeis brought
twelve allegations against his conduct in the practice of law.62 The
core of most of these allegations involved a conflict of interest.63
Until the Industrial Revolution, conflicts of interest had been
examined primarily in the context of litigation representations.64
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted a rather basic
view of conflicts of interest.65 First, at the outset when a prospective
client is deciding whether to retain a particular lawyer, the lawyer is
required “at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or
connection with the controversy . . . .”66 The absolute duty to
disclose all information to the parties placed a significant burden

58 Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives,
24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970).
59 Id. at 3-5 (describing the four efforts to revise the Canons).
60 See John F. Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser’s
Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 134 (1966) (viewing that the Code needed aspirational
standards that set forth core principles); See id. at 137-39 (believing that a code for
regulating lawyers needed more than just bright-line rules).
61 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969); see generally, John F.
Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970) (discussing the history of the 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility).
62 See Frank, supra note 1, at 685 (examining all of the charges brought against Brandeis).
63 See Frank, supra note 1, at 692, 694.
64 See Swaine, supra note 10, at 89, 171(explaining the evolution of lawyering during the
industrialization period in America).
65 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
66 Id.
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upon the lawyer.67 Second, Canon 6 prohibits lawyers from
representing conflicting interests “except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of all the facts.”68 Finally,
Canon 6 attempts to define the prohibition against conflicts of interest
as a duty to represent clients with “undivided loyalty and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences” because of loyalties undertaken to
represent a new client.69 An examination of two allegations made
against Brandeis presented open-ended conflict of interest questions
for the lawyer.70
In the Lennox bankruptcy representation, the creditors of
Lennox sought to hire Brandeis to help resolve a crisis in the
financial situation of the company.71 Brandeis accepted the matter
because he was convinced by his clients that the creditor and debtor
had a common interest to work out the crisis.72 Apparently, Brandeis
did not clarify whether he represented the Lennox Company or Mr.
Lennox, and, if he did represent them, whether there was a limitation
on the scope of the representation.73 After examining the situation,
Brandeis concluded that a work out of the financial crisis was not
possible, and, therefore, he urged the company to transfer assets to a
trust for the benefit of the creditors.74 Eventually, the company
67

Id.
Id.
69 Id.
70
See, e.g., Frank, supra note 1, at 694-98, 697 n.44, 700-02; Helm, supra note 1, at 5-6,
9, 11.
71 Frank, supra note 1, at 699-700; Spillenger, supra note 1, at 1505.
72 Morris Weisman, Brandeis and the Lennox Case, 47 COM. L.J. 36, 38 (1942). The
allegations, however sought to ascribe a financial motive for accepting the representations:
That he took employment from a client, advised him to make an
assignment for the benefit of his creditors, had his own partner appointed
the assignee and afterwards denied that he had ever been employed by
the client. That at the time he took the employment and gave the advice
he was the attorney of one of the largest creditors of the client and for
whose benefit the assignment was made, and in connection with the
question whether the assignment should be made or not, was advising
another of the large creditors. That he later repudiated his employment
by his client and prosecuted a petition in bankruptcy against him
alleging, as an act of bankruptcy, the making of the assignment that he
himself had advised him to make. Out of this course of conduct he made
for himself and his firm fees amounting to $43,852.
3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298.
73 Frank, supra note 1, at 700 (explaining the case by pointing out that Lennox could not
have reasonably viewed Brandeis as representing his interests while also indicating that
Lennox sought to conceal assets and Brandeis would not let him do so).
74 Frank, supra note 1, at 699-700.
68
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entered bankruptcy.75 The core of the complaint against Brandeis
was that he represented conflicting interests in seeking to work out
the financial crisis.76 In defense of Brandeis, the law of representing
unintended clients when a lawyer commenced a multiple client
representation was not well developed.77 And, one could argue that
his exploratory work on the financial situation did not rise to the level
of representing the Lennox interests.78
In another matter involving an ethics allegation against
Brandeis, the Warren trust representation, he represented the Warren
Company, a paper mill that was owned by the family of a law
partner.79 Brandeis helped place the assets of the family into a trust
and then proceeded to lease out some of the property to several
family members.80 When a lawsuit arose to invalidate the lease,
Brandeis defended the lease in the lawsuit on behalf of the lessees.81
Eventually, the case was dropped and other members of the family
bought out the beneficiary.82 The core of the complaint against
Brandeis was that he should have declined to prepare a lease of the
property from the family trust to family members, and also should
have declined to represent the beneficiary in seeking to uphold the
lease.83 At that time, Brandeis viewed his representation broadly as
including the family, and also including the trust and the members of
the trust.84 The ethical rules of lawyering at the time did not provide
guidance for lawyers who were confronted with the situation that
Brandeis faced.85

75

Frank, supra note 1, at 700.
Frank, supra note 1, at 700. Such a claim would only be valid if Brandeis had
undertaken a representation of both creditor and debtor. Id. at 701.
77 Frank, supra note 1, at 701-02; Spillenger, supra note 1, at 1488-89.
78 Although this is a plausible explanation, today a lawyer in a similar situation or case
would be sure to warn the non-client in a writing that the lawyer did not represent the nonclient’s interests. This would have prevented Lennox from later claiming that Brandeis was
representing his interests. Frank, supra note 1, at 702.
79 Frank, supra note 1, at 694.
80 Frank, supra note 1, at 694.
81 Frank, supra note 1, at 694-95.
82 Frank, supra note 1, at 695.
83
Frank, supra note 1, at 695; 3 Hearings, supra note 3, at 298-99 (quoting “[t]hat he for
a long time represented and collected fees from two clients whose interests were
diametrically opposed to each other and when they, later, went to law over those same
conflicting interests he took employment for one of them against the other”).
84 Frank, supra note 1, at 694-96.
85 Frank, supra note 1, at 697-98.
76
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The Senate hearings on the various transactions illustrated
how difficult it is to guide lawyers on specific conflicts of interest.86
The language of Canon 6 is too absolute and without much subtle
nuance.87 No lawyer in practice can avoid all conflicts of interest.
The rules must identify conflicts that rise to the level of requiring
client consent and should identify the manner in which lawyers must
analyze those conflicts. Subsequent developments in the Model Code
and the Model Rules improved upon this guidance in the rules of
professional responsibility.88 Correspondingly, the drafters of these
codes of conduct were clearly aware of the questions that were raised
in the Brandeis hearings and they sought to address lawyering in the
transaction context.89
VI.

DIFFERENT VIEWS OF BRANDEIS’ CONCEPTION OF
LAWYERING FOR MULTIPLE CLIENTS

The impact Louis Brandeis had upon the modern day ethical
rules requires an examination of his multiple client representations.
A number of scholars have examined the different representations
that raised ethical concerns and the justifications offered by the
supporters during the Louis Brandeis hearings for Justice of the
Supreme Court.90 It is important to remember Brandeis himself never
86

1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 277-79.
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 45, at Canon 6.
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1982).
89 Alysa C. Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family
Business: The Lawyer as Intermediary, 73 IND. L.J. 567, 578 (1998) (quoting “In 1983, in
large part due to the efforts of Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter to the Kutak Commission, which
was responsible for drafting the Model Rules, the American Bar Association incorporated
Brandeis’s concept of ‘lawyer for the situation’ into Model Rule 2.2.”).
90 See, e.g., Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 755-57.
As
Professor Hazard described,
The transactions complained of included the following: First,
Brandeis had at one time represented one party in a transaction, [then]
later represented someone else in a way that impinged on that
transaction. Second, he had acted in situations where those he served
had conflicting interests, for example by putting together the bargain
between parties to a business deal. Third, he had acted for a family
business and continued so to act after a falling out among the family
required reorganization of the business arrangement. Fourth, over a
course of several years he had mediated and adjusted interests of the
owners and creditors of a business in such a way as to keep the business
from foundering.
HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 60.
87
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confirmed or rejected these defenses.91 However, these defenses
continue to occupy a prominent role in the jurisprudence of Brandeis’
concept of lawyering for multiple clients.
John Frank, a leading lawyer, viewed the Brandeis conduct
regarding the representation of multiple clients to reflect a lawyer
who sought to solve client problems and yield to client pressures.92
In no uncertain terms, Frank viewed this approach of representing
multiple clients too dangerous and would allow for individuals to
second guess the lawyer’s role in the matter.93 No matter how
tempting, lawyers should never act as “counsel for a situation”
because the risks are too high.94
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Thomas Shaffer adopted a
romanticized view of Brandeis’ lawyering for multiple clients.95
Hazard was attracted by the notion that clients often want to have one
lawyer represent all of their interests.96 In many cases this
perspective on lawyering produces the best result for all of the
clients. Hazard first wrote about this in his book, Ethics in the
Practice of Law, but later implemented this type of lawyering in
Model Rule 2.2, the Lawyer as Intermediary.97 The basic notion was
that lawyers can represent the best interests of all of the parties in
seeking to create a transaction or resolve a dispute.98 If the effort
fails, each of the parties can hire independent lawyers to represent
their interests.99 Professor Thomas Shaffer relied upon his religious
teachings to view lawyering in the family context as perfect for
91

Morris Weisman, supra note 72, at 37.
During the investigation of his record and character, and throughout
the attack, Brandeis made no effort to defend himself. Not a single word
of complaint came from him. Certain that he was free of legal or moral
wrong, he waited in silence, with sorrow in his heart for his traducers. In
him were deep wells of courage, the product of highest morality and
intellectual loftiness, of a rigid self-imposed discipline, and restraint.
For such a man to be charged with the breach of the most sacred canon
of professional ethics, disloyalty to a client, for a few pieces of silver,
was irony indeed.
Morris Weisman, supra note 72, at 37.
92 Frank, supra note 1, at 701-02.
93 Frank, supra note 1, at 708.
94 Frank, supra note 1, at 708.
95
HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 64-65.
96 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 63-64.
97 See generally HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1. See also MODEL RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1982); Rollock, supra note 89, at 578.
98 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 64-67.
99 HAZARD, PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 33.
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lawyering for the situation.100 He embraced the view that the
collective family interest was often in the best interests of the
individuals and that lawyers should have the freedom to offer legal
services to the family unit.101 The idea that each member of a family
may need to hire a separate lawyer was completely antithetical to the
interests of a family unit.102
Professor Clyde Spillenger had a slightly less charitable view
of Brandeis’ conception of lawyering.103 Spillenger’s historical work
led him to conclude that Brandeis believed in imposing his views
upon clients for their benefit.104 Brandeis’ independence and fidelity
to other interests caused him to limit client voice.105 This more
ambivalent view of Brandeis’ lawyering explains his representation
of multiple clients through this prism of a controlling lawyer who
imposed his views upon clients.
The romanticized perspective of lawyering for the situation
does offer an attractive explanation for what Brandeis did in his law
practice.106 However, it is unlikely that he meant to create a different
form of lawyering when he represented multiple clients. Instead, he
took his highly skilled legal mind and sought to address problems in a
methodical way. In my view, Brandeis believed that clients benefited
when lawyers could offer their skills obtained as an attorney. In my
opinion, Brandeis’ actions on behalf of multiple clients was in
response to client choice, and included a client decision to trust his
judgment, as their attorney, in addressing a legal problem.
Unfortunately, in today’s litigious climate, Model Rule 2.2
had many interpretive issues107 and was ultimately removed by the
ABA House of Delegates in 2002.108 The drafters placed many of the
concepts from Rule 2.2 in the comments of the general conflicts of

100 Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963,
980 (1987). Professor Shaffer has argued that the Warren family representation is a perfect
illustration of Brandeis’ “pattern of thought (and of practice)” for implementing the counsel
for the situation role. Id. (according to Shaffer, Brandeis rejected the notion of only
representing individuals for the notion that lawyers can represent and value human
harmony).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 981.
103
Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1449-51.
104 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1509.
105 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1449.
106 Spillenger, supra note 3, at 1502-04.
107 See Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 771-85.
108 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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interest rule, which is Model Rule 1.7.109 By referring to multiple
client representation in the comments to the general conflicts of
interest rules, the drafters left open in the text of the rule for lawyers
to continue to represent multiple clients in forming transactions and
resolving disputes. Clients continue to request one lawyer to
represent multiple parties in forming a transaction or resolving a
dispute.110 And, lawyers continue to offer services similar to the
work that Brandeis offered his multiple clients.111 Brandeis brought
collaborative representation of multiple clients into the forefront of
the legal profession, and the profession continues to grapple with the
proper manner to deliver such services.
VII.

CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF BRANDEIS TO THE
MODERN LAW OF LAWYERING

Without doubt, the charges leveled against Louis Brandeis in
the confirmation hearings were motivated by political hatred,
antisemitism, and economic protectionism.112 But this unsuccessful,
yet illegitimate, attack may have had an unintended but significant
influence upon the development of the law of lawyering.
The Senate debate placed a focus upon the importance of
ethical conduct for a leading lawyer under consideration for a seat on
the bench of the United States Supreme Court at a time when the
ABA and multiple states were adopting codes of conduct for
attorneys.113 The ABA realized that the promulgation of codes of
conduct was an important component of its quest for self-regulation
of the legal profession.114 However, the debate over the conduct of a
prominent lawyer in the public eye raised the stakes for those who
were drafting ethics codes. Ethics codes needed to provide lawyers
with guidance on how to address conflicts of interest in transactional
practice to avoid the types of allegations that were made against
Louis Brandeis.
The allegations were set in the context of conflicts of interest
in non-litigation, which illustrated the difficulty of drafting codes to
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 761.
111 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 776, 778.
112 Frank, supra note 1, at 683-84.
113 Frank, supra note 1, at 685.
114 See Abel, supra note 43, at 142 (examining the role of promulgating ethics codes in the
quest for self- regulation).
109
110
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address this area of legal ethics. This obstacle may have contributed
to the development of two different approaches to drafting ethics
codes – those who sought to focus on aspirational guidelines and
those who wanted more detailed guidance.115
The confirmation hearings also illustrated the prevalence and
importance of multiple client representation in business practice. The
inadequacy of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics to address
Brandeis’ conduct further demonstrated the need for the bar
regulators to pay closer attention to non-litigation practice.116
Louis Brandeis introduced the concept of intermediation into
the representation of multiple clients in transactions or dispute
resolution.117 This type of law practice framed a century long debate
involving client desire and independent lawyer judgment in resolving
the legal issues in a group setting. The debate over the proper role of
a lawyer continues today and we still recount the ethical dilemmas
faced by Louis Brandeis in his law practice. The debate over the
propriety of the conduct of Louis Brandeis has contributed
significantly to shaping the modern law of lawyering.

115 William T. Ellis & Billie J. Ellis, Beyond the Model Rules: Aristotle, Lincoln, and the
Lawyer’s Aspirational Drive to an Ethical Practice, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 591, 597-98
(2009).
116 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 757-58.
117 Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 2, at 748-49.
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